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ISSUES  AND  APPROACH
Agricultural trade negotiations have been especially complicated and controversial.
Complications  arise because,  in addition to border measures  such as import barriers and
export subsidies, nations  employ a mind boggling array of internal agricultural subsidies
and regulations.  Among the important issues encountered  during negotiations, and in their
aftermath,  is  the  compatibility  of  internal  programs  with  the  legal  and  economic
implications  of the trade agreement.  Free trade agreements  do  not necessarily  require
commitments  on internal commodity subsidies and regulations, but such agreements  may
imply economically  that certain policies are not sustainable.
There  are  several  types  of  compatibility  problems  that  arise  with  internal
commodity programs under free trade.  First, a program may be unsustainable  for financial
reasons.  A program designed  to transfer funds from the treasury may have acceptable
budget costs  with import  limits,  but  these  costs  may  explode  when trade  is allowed.
Second,  a program may contain price or other guarantees that simply fail to be feasible  in
the face of  imports.  A program may promise outcomes that are not economically possible
unless imports can be controlled.  Third, a subsidy or internal regulatory program may be
feasible  and have relatively  low budget  costs, but violate the free trade agreement itself
by  implicitly  blocking  importation  through  economic  means.  Fourth,  for exporters,
domestic  commodity  programs  may  act  as  effective  export  subsidies,  and  thus  be
incompatible with  free trade agreements  on legal  grounds.  Note, compatibility problems
three and four may lead to trade disputes rather than internal inconsistencies.
The relationships between trade agreements and internal commodity programs may
be  dealt  with  in  two  ways.  First,  international  negotiations  may  develop  binding
commitments  on  internal  subsidies  and  regulations.  This  was  the approach  taken  in
negotiating the Uruguay Round Agreement for agriculture of the General  Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade (GATT)/World  Trade Organization  (WTO)  (URA).  Because certain
internal  programs  were  seen  to  have  trade effects,  an attempt  was  made  to  draw  up48  Proceedings
binding commitments to limit the  scope of such programs.  A second approach is to focus
the trade agreement  itself on border measures  and  let the  incompatibility with  free trade
apply pressure  on the internal programs.  Such pressure  may be through direct  budget or
economic implications,  or through  legal means such as nullification and impairment clauses,
or antidumping and countervailing  duties cases.
Two polar-case solutions  to the compatibility  question may be mentioned  to set the
stage.  The first solution is to abandon opening the borders at all.  If the domestic commodity
programs seem to be absolutely  incompatible  with open markets,  the free trade agreement
may simply leave that commodity out.  This approach was taken for several  supply-managed
commodities  in Canada's agreements with the United States, Mexico  and Chile.  A second
solution is to go far beyond the free trade agreement  and harmonize  internal commodities
policies (and perhaps adopt common border policies as well).  The European Union (EU) has
moved a substantial way down this path.
This paper continues  as  follows.  The next section contains  an analysis of how free
trade affects the domestic economics of common commodity program types.  We lay out the
simple analytics  of stylized  commodity  programs  and  show how  the  familiar results  are
affected  by  the  introduction  of free  trade.  This  section  includes  a  discussion  of how
compatibility issues, with respect to common farm programs, were addressed in NAFTA and
the URA.  The third section uses the example of free trade among states in the United  States
to consider further when policies that vary geographically  are compatible with open borders.
In  particular,  we  examine  the  incompatibility  of federal  and  state  dairy  policy  and  the
pressure  for a  kind of harmonization.  The  next  section presents  an  argument  for  letting
border pressures  discipline internal programs  rather than including commitments on internal
support  in  trade  agreements.  A  concluding  section  draws  implications  for  the  trade
agreements  and for nations domestic policy reforms.
THE  SIMPLE  ANALYTICS  OF  COMMODITY  PROGRAM  COMPATIBILITY
WITH FREE TRADE
This section uses a series of familiar commodity policy models to focus our discussion
on how particular types of commodity  programs are  affected  by opening  up  international
markets.  We show how the impacts of policies  such as price supports, marketing quotas  and
direct payment programs  may be affected  by free trade.  In the discussion that follows, we
analyze  the  effects  of a  free trade  agreement  on welfare,  budget  costs, and  other policy
objectives  under  a variety  of stylized commodity  programs  (as  in McCalla  and  Josling,
1985).
These programs  are examined  using a series of figures  that illustrate the economic
impact  of  free  trade  on  a  country  that  has  a  particular  commodity  program  in  place.
Commodity program cases considered  are:
(1) a production  subsidy which is sufficient to exclude imports;
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(2)  a production subsidy under which some imports flow under free trade;
(3)  a price support;
(4)  a production  quota which is held  fixed in response to imports;
(5)  a production  quota which is adjusted when free trade  is introduced;  and
(6)  direct payments unrelated  to current output.
In each figure we show only two countries; the country with the domestic policy upon which
we  focus  is  labeled  "home",  the  other  country  is labeled  "foreign".  For simplicity,  we
examine cases in which there is no trade initially and only the home country has an internal
commodity program.  In the figures, Df corresponds  to foreign demand and Dh corresponds
to foreign demand;  Sf is foreign supply and  Sh is home supply.  The excess supply for the
foreign  country is E  = Sf - Df.
The first  commodity program considered  is a per unit production  subsidy of v.  In
Figure 1, autarky equilibrium price and quantity in the foreign country is shown as  (Pfa, qa).
Autarky price in the home country is determined by the intersection of the subsidy-included
supply curve Shv with Dh.  At this point, production is  q h  consumer price is p h, and producer











Figure 1.  Production Subsidy (Case 1)
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Now let us open the border and allow imports.  Since imports from the foreign country
to the home country  must compete with the  consumer price in the home country,  the effect
of free trade  upon the autarky equilibrium  depends upon the sign of the excess supply Ef,  at
Phv.  In the first case illustrated,  the production  subsidy v has depressed  the home consumer
price  so much  that the  foreign  country  would  actually  be  an  importer if the border  was
opened  (phv <  Pa).  In this case,  opening the border places  no direct pressure on the operation
of the domestic program  in the home  country.  If exports from the home country to foreign
market were allowed with no complaint,  the effective  demand in the home country would be
Dh + Ev.  The price to consumers  in the home market would rise and the quantity consumed
would rise to include exports.
However,  since pv is below cost of production,  trade flowing in this direction could
be ruled as dumping and subject to import restrictions  in the foreign country.  Assuming that
the countervailing  duties imply no exports  from home to  fbreign,  "free trade" will have  no
effect upon  the autarky equilibrium.  However,  there  is a clear conflict  between free trade
and  the  production  subsidy,  since the  subsidy  implicitly  blocks  exports  from the  foreign
country to the home country  by lowering the  home market consumer price.
To see the  impact the home production subsidy has on the foreign country, note that
with  no  subsidy  and  free  trade,  price  would  be  p*.  The  production  subsidy  causes  an
increase  in consumer  surplus  in  the foreign  country of I, but producer surplus  is lower by
I+K.  Therefore,  the subsidy in the home country  imposes a loss in potential welfare in its
partner country  equal to K.  By implicitly blocking  trade, the  subsidy results in a reduction
in  welfare  in  the  foreign  country  relative  to  what  it  would  be  able  to  achieve  with no
commodity program in place  in the home country.  Of course home country welfare is also
lower, at least as conventionally  measured.
In Figure 2, the home country still uses a production  subsidy ofv.  However, Ef is now
greater than zero at PhV. Therefore,  even with the subsidy, there will be imports into the home
country.  With  a  free  trade  agreement,  but  with  the  subsidy  remaining  in  place,  the
equilibrium price of pv*  is determined  by the intersection  of Shv+Ef  and Dh.  With the free
trade agreement,  home production falls from qh,  to qv,v  and imports are  q hvt  q hvh  As imports
enter into the  home  country,  both  producer  and  consumer  prices  fall.  With trade,  home
producer surplus is lower compared to autarky by A+B, and home consumer surplus is higher
by C+D+E+F+G.  As illustrated,  the net gain  in home welfare caused  by free trade is F+G.
In addition to the changes in producer and consumer surplus,  free trade affects the budgetary
costs  of the  subsidy program.  Since  we  are  assuming  for now that the per  unit subsidy
remains  the same with  free trade,  there  is  a reduction  in budgetary  costs of v(qhv -avh ).
Finally,  note that with free trade, market price in the foreign country increases from  Pa to P,*
which results  in a loss  to foreign consumers,  a gain to foreign producers, and a net foreign
welfare  gain shown by area J.
When  the initial production  subsidy  is  not so large  as to depress the  home country
price beyond  the point that eliminates  all  trade, both countries experience  a net increase in
the  sum  of producer  and  consumer  surplus  from  a  free  trade  agreement.  In  addition,
budgetary  costs of the subsidy  are  lower.  Of course,  the  production  subsidy remains  an
implicit trade barrier  and might be subject to  a nullification  and impairment  case.  While
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production  subsidies are often discussed,  such pure programs  are not often used.  Even the
U.S.  deficiency  payment  schemes  did not  constitute this  sort  of stylized  program.  The
budgetary cost of such a program would have been prohibitive,  so the United States used
base rules and land idling to contain costs.  The net result was output that likely differed little
from the no subsidy equilibrium (Sumner,  1995a; ERS,  1996; Smith and Glauber,  1996 and;
Young and Westcott,  1996).
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Figure 2. Production Subsidy (Case 2)
The  next commodity  program  considered  is  a  price  support  that  is  operated  in
conjunction with a subsidy to consumers of the amount necessary  to clear the  market.  In
Figure  3, the support price  is fixed at Phs.  The government does not acquire  stocks with this
policy; in order to clear the market of excess  output, it must offer a subsidy to consumers of
c.  Consumer price is Phs - c, and the policy is a transfer from taxpayers to both the producers
and the consumers of the commodity.  In a very stylized way, this illustrates the broad policy
that Mexico  pursued  for corn prior  to NAFTA  and  the  introduction of the PROCAMPO
program.
With  free  trade,  but  maintaining the  price support,  home  country  producer  price
remains  Phs  and output remains qh,.  Commodity  will flow into the home country  until the
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free  trade equilibrium price of p 5 * is reached.  This price  is determined by the intersection
of the total supply curve  in the home country (qhs + Et),  with the demand curve,  Dh.
Since producer price and  output in the home country remain constant, the  free trade
agreement does not change producer  surplus.  It does cause an increase in consumer surplus
in the home  country  of A+B+C.  There  is also  an  increase  in budgetary  costs of  A+B
because  the per unit consumer subsidy increases  by (Phs - c) - ps*  for the domestic quantity
qhs.  In the foreign country,  free trade causes a net welfare gain of E.
Figure 3.  Price Support
The free  trade agreement  makes the domestic  price support and consumer  subsidy
harder to maintain because  the budget cost increases.  At the same time, consumer support
for the combined program  is mitigated because  low priced  imports are  available, making
their gain from the subsidy less obvious.  With the price support and domestic subsidy, there
is also potential for trade dispute.  In this case,  home country  output is unaffected by imports.
This  implies  an extra loss  in  foreign  country  producer  surplus compared  to a production
subsidy.
An alternative price support policy would be  for the home government to support the
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it, or disposing of it in some way that does not affect the market price.  Under this policy
both producer and  consumer price is Phs  and quantity consumed falls from qhs to qhss.  With
free trade, and such a high price in the home country,  exports from the foreign country will
be Ef (Phs).  As illustrated,  the home government will be committed to purchasing  (q  hs  +
Ef(Phs)) - qhss of the commodity.
With this policy there definitely is no longer a trade conflict.  In the foreign country,
net welfare gain from free trade is E+F, which is much larger than it would be in the absence
of the home country program.  However,  free trade has resulted in an increase in budgetary
costs in the home country which may not be sustainable.
Figure 4 illustrates a production or marketing quota which remains constant under free
trade.  The quota in the home country is set at qha which in autarky would result in the quota
constrained price in the home country,  Pha,  and quota rents of A+B.  With free trade, market
price  in the home country  will  fall to pq*.  At pq *, consumer surplus  in the home country
increases by A+C+D, and quota rents decrease by A.  Thus, free trade causes distributional
effects,  but there  is an increase  of total welfare  in the home  country of C+D.  With this
policy, the producer  gains in the foreign country from a free trade are larger than they would
be  in the absence of the quota.  By restricting production, the quota drives up the  free trade
agreement price and allows additional  exports.  With a constant production or marketing
quota in an importing country there will be no trade conflict with the exporter, but the quota
rents in the home country  decline drastically.
Figure 4.  Production or Marketing Quota
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In order to see more  clearly the effect that import competition  can have upon quota
rents,  Figure  5  depicts  an  alternative  policy  in  which  the  quota quantity  is  adjusted  in
response to the  free trade agreement.  Autarky  equilibrium will be the same as in Figure 4,
with home country  price of Pha and  quota rents of A+B+C.  In this case, under a free trade
agreement,  rather  than  leave  the  quota  fixed  and  allow  imports  to  expand  to  take  the
additional  market, the home country  expands  its production  quota to  qh.  Price falls to Ph
which is enough to preclude imports.  Now, compared  to the case where the quota remains
constant,  there is  an  increase  in consumer  surplus  of  A+D,  and  an  increase  in producer
surplus ofF.  However,  free trade has resulted in a decrease  in quota rents  from A+B+C to
B+E.  The net effect on producers  is (E+F)  - (A) which is  assumed to be  negative, or the
quota would have  been expanded without a free trade  agreement.
Figure 5.  Production or Marketing Quota (Quota adjusts to eliminate  imports)
Under the adjusted home country  quota policy, the foreign equilibrium with free trade
is  the same as  under autarky because exports  remain  zero.  The  foreign country suppliers,
who presumably pressured for free trade would see no benefit.  The losers with free trade are
the  holders of quota who would see the value  of their quota rents decrease.  If the result is
obvious prior  to the agreement  the home country producer  lobby would argue  vigorously
against free trade  for their industry.  Foreign exporters would be indifferent and consumers
in the two countries would be split.  Home country  consumers will argue for free trade, not
because  they  would  benefit  from trade,  but because  a  free  trade agreement  would  force
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because  they would  benefit  from trade,  but because  a  free  trade agreement  would  force
domestic policy adjustment.  Some argue that this case may approximate what would happen
if  the Canadian dairy market were opened to imports from the United States (Barichello  and
Romain,  1996; Meilke, Sarker and LeRoy, 1996;  and Veeman  and St. Louis,  1996.  See also
Moschini  and Meilke,  1987  and Alston and  Spriggs,  1996).
The last commodity program  considered  is a direct payment to producers that is not
tied to current production.  Since these direct payments do not alter economic  incentives on
the margin, the equilibrium adjustments when trade is introduced are the same as they would
be in the absence of the program.  In Figure 6, direct payments are represented by area D.
The  autarky equilibrium is at price Pha and quantity  qha in the home country, and price p faand
quantity  qfa  in the  foreign country.  With free trade, the equilibrium price decreases  to p*,
production  increases  in the foreign country,  and falls in the home country.  The policy has
had no  effect on equilibrium adjustments  to free trade or welfare.  Of course,  if payments
demand production of a particular crop or have  other ties to output, then we are back to the
cases  illustrated in Figures  1 and 2.
The variety of policies that could be examined  in this way is long and tedious.  We
might mention such programs  as subsidized crop insurance  (which is similar to a production
subsidy) and subsidies tied to land set asides.  As a final example,  we will consider a policy
of price discrimination practiced in conjunction with price pooling or blend pricing.
Figure 6.  Direct Payment
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AN  EXAMPLE  OF  U.S.  DAIRY  PROGRAM  COMPATIBILITY  WITH  TRADE
AMONG  U.S.  STATES
For the most part, agricultural trade among the states and regions of  the United States
is open.  The major exception is the case of milk for  fresh use which is regulated by federal
and state marketing orders.  The federal marketing orders regulate milk sold within particular
geographic boundaries,  and limit incentives  for arbitrage from milk that is not regulated in
that jurisdiction.  As a part of the implementation of the FAIR Act of 1996, the boundaries
are changing and the number of orders is being reduced dramatically  to between  10 and  14
(Cox and Sumner ,1996a; ERS,  1996).
California  is the only  major  dairy production  area  that  does not participate  in the
federal milk marketing order system.  Instead,  California maintains  its own milk marketing
order which predates the federal  system.  In the FAIR Act, California was invited to join the
federal system with the assurance that it could maintain  state borders  as the federal  order
region,  and  that  it  could  maintain  its  market-share  quota  program.  The  incentive  for
California to join the  federal  system provides  a lesson  in  farm  policy compatibility  and
harmonization.
Both the federal and California milk marketing orders maintain price discrimination
such  that milk  used  for  fresh  products  receives  a  price differential  above  milk  used  for
manufactured products.  The revenue  from all milk sales are placed in order-wide revenue
pools and distributed back to producers,  irrespective of how the milk from any specific farm
was actually  used.  In the  federal system,  the rents earned from price discrimination  in each
order  are  distributed  back  to producers  equally  as  a  weighted  average  pool  price.  The
average  and  marginal  per  unit  price  received  by  producers  uses  sales  of  fresh  and
manufactured products  from milk in that order  as weights,  and the order-specific  price of
each  end-use  class  of milk.  In  California  the procedure  is  similar  except  that  the  pool
revenue  is distributed back to individuals based on their ownership of pool quota (Sumner
and Wolf,  1996).  Currently  producers  receive  $1.70 per hundredweight of quota from the
pool before the rest of the revenue  is distributed.
Given the regionalization  of pricing policy, even under the federal  system the price
for milk in fresh use differs by region.  For example,  the price of fluid milk is higher in the
Southeast than it is in the Upper Midwest.  In addition,  utilization by end-use class differs
by region.  Milk  in the Upper  Midwest is used mostly for manufactured  products whereas
milk in the Southeast  is used mainly for fresh products.  Under  federal  law and regulation
this system is maintained and arbitrage is restricted,  though not without considerable regional
strife within the industry  (Cox and  Sumner,  1996a;  Cox and Sumner,  1996b).
The  restrictions  on  arbitrage  under  the federal  milk marketing  orders  have been
protected under U.S.  law even though restriction of trade among states is generally prohibited
by the Interstate Commerce Clause of the U.S. Constitution.  So whereas  arbitrage between
Wisconsin  and Florida  is restricted by  law,  California  is not allowed to restrict  arbitrage
associated with its price policy.  In the past, two factors reduced the pressure on California's
milk marketing order.  First, being geographically  isolated  from other major milk producing
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regions  has meant transport costs were relatively high.  Second,  California has  maintained
lower milk prices than neighbor  states.  In general, each class price and the blend price in
California  has been below that available in other markets.
It turns out however,  this is not enough to remove the  incentive for arbitrage.  Under
the federal  order,  a producer in Arizona would receive the blend price in the local  federal
order.  That blend price is  likely to be above the blend price in California,  but below the
California  class  1 price  paid  by  bottlers  of fresh  milk.  If the  difference  between  the
California class  1 price and the Arizona blend price is higher than the transport cost, there
is an  incentive for arbitrage.  Notice that this is a purely policy created arbitrage.  Cost of
production may be lower in California.  Yet as long as the class 1 price in California is above
the average price  in Arizona,  there are incentives  for class  1 milk to flow from Arizona into
California.
The result of this arbitrage in California is a substantial decline  in producer revenues
with little benefit for consumers.  The milk from out of state flows only into the high price
uses  so the  "imported"  milk reduces  the share of fresh  uses in the weighted  average price
received  by California producers.  It is unlikely that the arbitrage  could be restricted without
California joining the federal milk marketing order system, which is cumbersome and less
efficient than the  California program.
Consider the effect of creating  a California federal milk marketing order.  First, milk
from Arizona that was shipped to California would now be priced under the California order.
These producers, who as yet have no California pool quota, would receive the lowest of the
California blend prices, which is below the blend price they would receive  in Arizona.  With
policy  harmonization,  the  result would be  that no  trade  would flow,  and the California
producers would have a more cumbersome  and less efficient program.  This case is similar
to the U.S.-Canada dairy example discussed in the second section.  This case also shows how
policy harmonization,  or at least having a common jurisdiction, can reduce trade and reduce
policy efficiency.
THE DESIGN OF FREE TRADE AGREEMENTS:  BORDER MEASURES  VERSUS
INTERNAL MEASURES
Previous  sections have  shown that domestic  commodity programs  have  important
trade effects that may make them incompatible  with free trade agreements.  One  approach
to dealing with such programs  is to include internal support disciplines directly into the trade
agreement.  Internal  commodity  programs  may  be  made  compatible  with  a  free  trade
agreement by  simply including disciplines  on such programs  directly into the agreement.
This was  the approach taken in the Uruguay  Round agreement,  whereas NAFTA does not
attempt  to discipline  internal subsidies directly.
There seems to be broad acceptance of including internal subsidy programs  in trade
agreements.  Failure to include internal supports  has been seen as a reason agricultural trade
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reform  was  so limited  in previous  GATT rounds; NAFTA  is also seen  as  lacking for this
reason.  We argue that such a position is mistaken.  Such provisions are (1) unnecessary;  (2)
unworkable;  and (3)  positively counter productive  (Sumner,  1996).
Based on our discussion above there are two major reasons to focus trade agreements
on border measures,  as opposed  to internal  agricultural support measures.  First, as we have
seen in the second section, reducing trade barriers and export subsidies makes trade distorting
internal  subsidy programs much harder to  sustain.  This means that the benefits of dealing
directly with internal  subsidies  and barriers  in the trade agreement may  add  little.  When
faced with open borders  the policies disciplined would have relatively little scope for effect,
or would be prohibitively expensive.  The benefits  of internal support provisions  of trade
agreements  are likely to stimulate little reform for a second reason.  As a matter of  practical
fact,  such provisions  are  unlikely to  be workable.  This  means that  a  series  of complex
provisions may be agreed to but little real policy will be affected.  In this case, something  is
not better than  nothing.  Third,  basic GATT  articles and  other trade  law already  include
provisions that can be used to limit production subsidies; including provisions  on internal
supports  in  a trade  agreement  risks  a  reduction  in  furthering  the effectiveness  of those
provisions
We developed the first point in some detail in the previous  sections.  Border barriers
and export subsides are sometimes required in order to make  internal programs feasible.  If
the  border measures  are themselves removed  or reduced, the  trade effects  of the internal
subsidies are themselves limited.  Further, many trade distorting internal subsidies have been
reformed in recent years, either through pressures from trade agreements (as  in Mexico)  or
as a part of a larger reform process with little or no attention to trade agreements  (as  in the
United States).
One way to examine the workability of disciplines on internal supports is to consider
the evolution and implementation of the internal support provisions in the Uruguay Round
Agreement.  The Uruguay Round Agreement  for agriculture devotes more  space to internal
support than to either of  the border measures.  The result of this effort is a text that imposes
no serious commitments on any of the largest agricultural traders, and a text that has had zero
effect on agricultural trade.  The reasons  for this result are not accidental.  First, domestic
subsidy programs  occur with such variety and have such complex effects (many of which
have very little to do with trade) that it is literally impossible to create effective, enforceable
policy  commitments in the  context of a multilateral  agreement.  There  are just too many
individual policies  to discipline each policy  individually, and the idea of using an index of
trade effects  of policies  has  proven  illusive.  For  example, there  is no  policy  index that
measures trade impact exclusive of changing market conditions which are beyond the control
of the country making a commitment.  Second,  aggregation of policies into an index tends
to ignore their differential  trade impacts, and may encourage more trade distorting policies
in preference to less distorting policies.  For example, the definition of programs classified
U.S.  crop  disaster  assistance  into  a  green  category,  when  it  has  encouraged  planting on
marginal land and thus increased U.S. production  and exports.  Alternatively,  the deficiency
payment  program,  which  probably  reduced  production  and  export  of  grains,  was  not
considered  green  under URA provisions.  Third, with such complexity  it is easy  to build
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deliberate  loopholes  into  the text  so that  internal  programs  in  major negotiating  nations
remain undisciplined  in fact.
Of course even politicians  and  trade lawyers  recognize  that domestic  commodity
programs can reduce  imports or increase  exports.  In trade agreements,  a country's interests
are expressed,  almost exclusively,  in terms of  the value of net exports rather than as national
income,  or producer  and consumer surplus, so any policy that tends to increase net exports
(that is, any policy that either expands  exports  or constrains  imports) is a candidate  for trade
sanctions.  For many years this economic logic was formally incorporated in international
trade law in several ways without specific text disciplining domestic programs directly.  The
GATT and national trade policies both have provisions to discipline production subsidies of
other countries that were considered detrimental  to industry interests.  GATT articles VI (on
antidumping and countervailing duties), XVI (on subsidies) and XXIII  (on nullification and
impairment)  all  deal  with  attempting  to  limit  the  use  of policy  measures  that  have  a
detrimental impact on the trade interests of other countries,  even when there has not been an
explicit GATT agreement on the particular policy measure.
Given these other provisions, international negotiations and agreements  on internal
support  are  not  irrelevant;  we  argue  that  they  are  positively  harmful  to  progress  in
agricultural liberalization.  By including text on internal supports in a multilateral agreement,
the ability  to use WTO  provisions  related  to nullification  and  impairment  is  weakened.
Including explicit  internal  support commitments  in a trade agreement  may make  it more
difficult to use the  other legal remedies.  Countries  with distorting internal  subsidies  may
now argue that they are complying with an explicit agreement when they maintain  subsidies
that impair border measure concessions.  Further, by diverting attention away  from border
measures,  including  internal  support  in  the  negotiating  process  reduces  the  amount  of
progress made on the policies that block imports or subsidize  exports directly.
SUMMARY
This paper has explored  a variety of ways that domestic commodity programs  may
be incompatible with a free trade agreement.  We show in general that if a policy creates  an
incentive  for arbitrage,  the policy may be unsustainable  after trade reform.  We also show
that if  the policy blocks the economic forces of free trade it may be vulnerable  to countervail
or to nullification  and impairment cases.  In some cases, a free trade agreement may even be
incompatible with a program because no trade  flows after the agreement.  Finally, we argue
that,  given  the  economic  and  legal  forces  that  make  many  trade  distorting  programs
incompatible  with elimination of border barriers and export subsidies, there is little reason
to include disciplines on internal commodity programs in trade agreements.  In fact, we argue
that the attempt to include such disciplines  weakens  free trade agreements.
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